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Abstract—We propose a variant of the well-known AONT-RS
scheme for dispersed storage systems. The novelty consists in
replacing the Reed-Solomon code with rateless Luby transform
codes. The resulting system, named AONT-LT, is able to improve
the performance by dispersing the data over an arbitrarily large
number of storage nodes while ensuring limited complexity.
The proposed solution is particularly suitable in the case of
cooperative storage systems. It is shown that while the AONT-
RS scheme requires the adoption of fragmentation for achieving
widespread distribution, thus penalizing the performance, the
new AONT-LT scheme can exploit variable length codes which
allow to achieve very good performance and scalability.
Index Terms—Applied Cryptography, Cloud Security, Secure
System Design.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, online storage services have obtained
an increasing commercial success. Solutions like iCloud,
Dropbox, Skydrive, etc., are well known and used on a daily
basis by millions of people all over the world. These solutions
are based on the same approach: the service provider buys or
rents a large number of servers in which authorized clients
are able to store their data. By exploiting such a large number
of servers, information protection can be achieved through
suitable data encoding and slicing. In this case, the client
or provider software decomposes the file into smaller blocks
(from now on called slices) which are properly processed
and then dispersed to the storage sites. Dually, when a client
desires to read a file, he retrieves some subset of the slices,
which are combined to reconstruct the original file. Obviously,
a structure of this type implies very high initial costs, necessary
to guarantee a high performance service in terms of storage
availability and connection capabilities; moreover, a crucial
issue concerns reliability against failures.
To implement this kind of services with lower costs, a new
approach has recently emerged and is now rapidly growing:
it consists in using cooperative storage, which means that the
storage capacity is provided directly by the clients themselves
who, co-operating in the cloud, make their own storage
facilities available to the others. This approach offers some
evident advantages: first of all the service provider only needs
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a low number of servers, acting as coordinators for the access
to the service. Secondly, increasing the number of users yields
an increase of the storage capabilities.
So, in a cooperative storage system (CSS), even more
than in a conventional distributed storage system (DSS), it
is expected that the number of storage nodes becomes very
large, offering the possibility of dispersing the data over a
huge number of distinct nodes.
Actually, data slicing is at the basis of a security paradigm
that, over the cloud, does not need the use of pre-shared en-
cryption keys. In such a scheme, the storage system transforms
a file into n distinct slices and only the client (or attacker) hav-
ing access to, at least, k out of the n slices is able to reconstruct
the file. Instead, the client or attacker with a number of slices
lower than k is not able to get any information. This basic
principle has been applied since the pioneer works by Shamir
[1] and Rabin [2], and subsequently confirmed by McEliece
and Sarwate [3] who disclosed the relationship with Reed-
Solomon (RS) coding schemes. Actually, the strength of RS
codes in this kind of applications is in the fact that these codes
are maximum distance separable (MDS), which implies it is
sure that by knowing k slices (arbitrarily distributed among
the n) the whole file can be successfully recovered. Such a
feature implies a characteristic step function behavior for the
curve of successful decoding probability as a function of the
erasure rate pe (defined as the percentage of storage nodes
that cannot be accessed, by the client or the attacker), which
is 1 for pe ≤ k/n and 0 for pe > k/n. Obviously we expect
that the value of pe for the attacker is greater than that for the
client.
It is intuitively reasonable that by increasing the number of
slices (and then the number of storage nodes if, for example,
each node stores a single slice) we can have some important
advantages. In particular, a larger number of slices can result
in:
- the possibility, for the client, to tolerate higher values of
pe without incurring in information losses;
- the need, for the attacker, to crack a larger number of
nodes to steal the data;
- the opportunity to exploit even minimal storage units, as
offered by service users, to store a significant piece of
information.
Unfortunately, however, when using an RS(n, k) code the
number of slices is related to the size of the Galois Field (GF)
where the RS code is defined: the greater the value of n the
larger the GF. As it will be explained in Section II, this has
an impact on the complexity: no proposals have appeared till
now using RS codes defined over Galois fields with more than
256 elements, that is n ≤ 255, and this severely limits the
achievable slicing level. To overcome the problem, different
coding schemes have been adopted as well. Among them, a
smart solution consists in using Luby transform (LT) codes
[4].
LT codes, proposed by Michael Luby in 2002 [5], are an
example of universal erasure correcting codes. The length of
an LT codeword can be freely varied in real time during the
encoding operations; for this reason, LT codes are also said to
be rateless: in fact, while the input word length (k) is fixed, the
output word length (n) can be chosen “on the fly”. It is easy to
understand that such a feature makes LT codes very interesting
in cooperative storage scenarios. Using LT codes, in fact, there
is no limit, in principle, on the value of n. Moreover, the
coding and decoding operations have low complexity (much
smaller than those of the RS codes), since they are based on
simple XOR operations and efficient belief propagation (BP),
respectively. On the other hand, an LT code is not MDS and,
in this sense, it exhibits a sub-optimal behavior: to recover the
whole file, it is necessary to have access to a number of slices
(slightly) larger than k and, generally speaking, the curve of
the successful decoding probability is not the step function
typical of the RS codes. Though important, these drawbacks
can be largely mitigated through a suitable code design and, as
a matter of fact, LT codes appear as a valid alternative to RS
codes also from the data repair and data retrieval standpoints
[4].
In this paper, we exploit LT codes to propose a new secure
and reliable information processing algorithm for CSS, which
is based on the combination of these codes with an all-
or-nothing-transform (AONT) [6]. The security challenge is
particularly evident in the case of CSS [7], [8]. This is because,
in a CSS, data are not delivered to a trusted entity that controls
the storage nodes and guarantees their trustworthiness; hence,
the nodes are intrinsically vulnerable and exposed to the
action of malicious eavesdroppers. The AONT ensures the
confusion and diffusion properties that are at the basis of any
efficient secure system, while the combination with an error
correcting code allows to make the system robust against some
node failures. The AONT has been combined with systematic
RS codes in [9], showing its ability to achieve improved
computational performance, security and integrity. The AONT-
RS system, however, suffers the limitation mentioned above on
the maximum number of usable storage nodes. A conceptually
simple way to overcome the limit consists in applying RS
coding to single fragments of the input file. We call this
scheme AONT-RS with fragmentation. As will be shown
afterward, however, fragmentation penalizes the performance
and the step behavior of the successful decoding probability
may be lost. So, in this paper we propose, for the first time
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Fig. 1. AONT-RS principle.
to the best of our knowledge, an AONT-LT system and we
prove, through explicit examples, that it is able to outperform
the AONT-RS with fragmentation.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows.
In Section II we shortly describe the AONT-RS system and
introduce the fragmentation option; in Section III we present
the new AONT-LT proposal; in Section IV we discuss some
numerical results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. AONT-RS
In principle, the security of a storage system could be
achieved by using a classic symmetric encryption scheme. It is
easy to understand, however, that such a conceptually simple
procedure can put serious problems as regards the key manage-
ment and distribution. If the same password used to access the
system is employed as a cryptographic key (that could seem an
easy-to-implement solution), the loss of the password, that is
not dramatic from the access standpoint as the system is able
to generate a new password, is disruptive from the encryption
standpoint as the new password is obviously unable to decrypt
the files encrypted with the old, lost password. Hence more
complex, and dangerous mechanisms should be conceived for
key management.
A desirable property is to avoid the secure storage of
encryption keys, but it is not foregone that this is achieved with
low computational and storage costs. As mentioned in Section
I, a smart technique for ensuring security and reliability in
a DSS without the need of external keys consists in using
AONT-RS [9]. The popular Symform service implements an
instance of the AONT-RS, by using AES-256 as the basis for
the AONT and the RS(96, 64) for coding.
The basic elements of the AONT-RS scheme are shown in
Fig. 1. This is a highly simplified figure, since it contains
the only information necessary to understand the variants
introduced by the new proposal in Section III. Further details,
here omitted for the sake of brevity, can be found in [9].
The data entering the AONT are composed of s+ 1 words
d0, ..., ds
a; a random key K is chosen and a symmetric key-
based encryption algorithm E, like AES, is used to obtain
ci = di ⊕ E(K, i+ 1). (1)
A final block is then computed as cs+1 = K ⊕ h, where
h is a hash digest of the s + 1 codewords ci, obtained
by using a standard hash algorithm such as SHA-256 (the
hash output is at least as long as K). Coherent with the
ad0, ..., ds−1 are data words while ds is an extra word, called canary,
which allows to check the integrity of the data after decoding.
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Fig. 2. AONT-RS with fragmentation. S/P and P/S stay for slice series-
parallel and parallel-series conversion respectively.
previous considerations, it is important to underline that K
is an internal key necessary to feed the AONT, but does
not represent a secret to be shared among authorized users.
The AONT package, formed by a set of s AONT words and
completed with padding bits if necessary, is sent to a slicer
that forms groups of k slices; the latter are then encoded by
the RS(n, k) code, thus obtaining, at the output, n slices. Each
slice is eventually stored in a different node. To retrieve the
data, a client (or an attacker) must recover a minimum of
k slices. After RS decoding, the AONT must be reversed as
well, but this is trivial starting from the entire package since,
by using simple XOR operations, the random key K can be
reconstructed and then used to decrypt the encrypted data.
Finally, the canary is checked to detect possible corruption. A
more comprehensive description can be found in [9].
It is well known that the value of n for an RS code is
determined by the size q = 2m of the Galois field GF(q)
where the code symbols are defined. More precisely, we have
n ≤ q− 1. Large values of n reflect into a greater size of the
GF, and this has an impact on the complexity, which becomes
higher and higher. For this reason, a common value for q is
256, which has also the practical advantage to represent each
element of the field (symbol) as a byte (m = 8). Larger values
of q are difficult to sustain as they become computationally
intractable. According to this choice, 255 is also the maximum
number of storage nodes in the CSS, under the hypothesis of
uploading only 1 slice per node. Wishing to adopt an RS code
with rate Rc ≈ 1/2, that is another common choice as well,
this means that the slicer must divide the data into groups of
128 slices, with the corresponding slicing level.
Wishing to store a file in a number of nodes ns > 255 and
avoiding, for the reasons explained, the adoption of a GF with
greater size, a possible solution is as follows.
According to the chosen value of ns, we have ks = Rc×ns
slices at the RS encoder input. These ks slices are split into t
fragments of k slices each, and any block is encoded with a
separate RS code with n ≤ 255. The situation is schematically
shown in Fig. 2. So, at the output of the parallel of t RS
encoders we have ns slices as desired. We will refer to this
solution as AONT-RS with fragmentation.
The scheme in Fig. 2, that replaces the right part of Fig.
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Fig. 3. Example of decoding of AONT-RS with fragmentation in the presence
of failures (pe = 0.4).
1, implicitly assumes that the AONT is applied to the whole
block of ks slices. This implies that, for correctly inverting
the AONT function, all the t RS decoding operations must be
successful. This fact may have an impact on the performance,
as clarified by the following simple example.
Example II.1 The channel model suited for the considered
scenario is the binary erasure channel (BEC). Let us consider
a system with ns = 765 nodes available; this implies that
t = 3 RS(255, 127) codes are used in parallel. Let us suppose
that pe = 0.4 and that, incidentally, the first 306 slices (i.e,
the nodes where they are stored) are inaccessible, for example
as damaged. The situation is depicted in Fig. 3. In this case,
the number of slices available for the three decoders is very
different: 0 for the first one, 204 for the second and 255 for
the third. So, the first decoder will fail, while the second and
the third decoders will experience a successful decoding. As
the AONT is applied on the whole set of slices, however,
one decoding failure is enough to prevent the correct reversal
of the AONT, so that the original file cannot be retrieved.
It is important to observe that this occurs for a value of pe
smaller than the code rate (≈ 0.5), while in case of using a
single code the same failure probability would not produce any
information loss. Clearly, if the 306 erasures were differently
distributed (for example, 102 for each codeword) all decoders
could be successful.
Example II.1 shows that when the AONT-RS system with
fragmentation is used and the AONT is applied to the whole
file, the successful decoding probability as a function of the
failure probability may degrade; in practice, all fragments must
be successfully decoded in order to be able to reverse the
AONT and this implies that the curve has no longer the step
behavior which is typical of a single RS code. Numerical
examples will be shown in Section IV. Symmetrically, the
attacker has normally access to a smaller number of nodes,
which is equivalent to assume for him a larger pe. Because
of the lack of the step behavior, his successful decoding
probability may be greater than 0 even for pe > Rc.
As an alternative option, one can think to apply the AONT
not to the whole block of ks slices but individually to every
block of k slices entering each encoder. However, this solution
is clearly more insecure, as it would permit an attacker to
disclose significant portions of the information, even with
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Fig. 4. Example of (a) LT single bit encoding operation and (b) corresponding
LT coding graph.
rather high values of pe. In fact, in this case it is sufficient
that decoding of a single fragment succeeds in order to invert
the AONT and recover its data. For this reason, the previous
solution should be preferred in practice. An example will be
given in Section IV.
III. AONT-LT
Wishing to pursue the target of data storage in a large
number of nodes (greater than that imposed by the size of the
RS code) without resorting to fragmentation (the latter having
the drawbacks discussed in Section II) we can resort to a
different solution, that is at the basis of our proposal. It consists
in replacing the RS code with an LT code, thus realizing an
AONT-LT system. A short review of the LT encoding and
decoding processes is reported next.
Although non-binary LT codes can be conceived as well
[10], in this paper we prefer to consider binary LT codes,
which is the favorite choice in distributed storage systems
because of their simplicity. To obtain a single coded bit:
1) a degree d is randomly chosen from a probability distri-
bution p(d), that must be properly designed;
2) d input bits are randomly selected from the input word
(having length k);
3) a coded bit is calculated as the XOR of the d input bits
chosen in step 2.
These 3 steps are repeated n times to generate an LT code-
word of n bits. Each encoded bit is independent of the previous
encoded bits and this is the reason why the LT codeword
length can be freely varied during encoding. The LT encoding
process can also be described through a bipartite graph, the
latter being particularly useful in the decoding process. Both
these representations are shown, for a toy example, in Fig. 4.
Looking at the figure, we have also an idea of the very low
computational complexity needed to perform the LT encoding
process. It reduces to XOR operations between the input bits,
and this kind of operations is very fast in modern CPUs.
Different decoding algorithms can be applied to LT codes.
Among them, a prominent role is played by message-passing
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Fig. 5. First iteration of BP decoding algorithm for the LT graph in Fig.
4(b).
algorithms like BP. The codeword bits have the meaning of
check nodes in the bipartite graph. The object of decoding is
to recover the input bits on the basis of the parity relationships
established by the check nodes. In short, decoding proceeds
as follows:
1) Find a check node with degree one and assign it to the
corresponding input symbol. If there is no such a node,
halt decoding and report its failure.
2) Add the value of the input symbol disclosed at step 1 to
all check nodes connected to it.
3) Remove from the graph all edges connected to the related
input symbol.
4) Iterate the first three steps until all input symbols are
recovered.
The first iteration of the decoding procedure is shown in
Fig. 5, for the same toy example of Fig. 4.
Obviously, in the presence of erasures, some check nodes
are missing and the reconstruction of the input bits is more
difficult. A crucial point concerns the choice of the distribution
p(d). Generally speaking, a trade-off should be found between
the need to have nodes with low degree (as we have seen,
degree one is required to start and feed the decoding process)
and the desire to have nodes with high degree, which guarantee
widespread connections with the input bits. In any case, the
mean value of d should be maintained small, as this ensures
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Fig. 6. AONT-LT principle.
a reduced number of operations.
In previous literature, a lot of rules have been presented
to design distributions able to comply efficiently with these
requirements. Among them, in our analysis and simulations,
we have selected the so-called robust soliton distribution
(RSD) [5]. The robustness of RSD is based on a couple of
parameters, c and δ, which can be adjusted to obtain optimal
performance with different length [11].
Wishing to combine the LT code with the AONT function,
the system we propose is shown in Fig. 6. In comparison with
Fig. 1, we see that the slicer is downstream of the encoder
(while it was upstream for the AONT-RS). The reason for
this choice is twofold: on one hand, contrary to RS codes,
LT codes have no need of a fixed length at the input; on the
other hand, it is known that the performance of LT codes gets
better and better for high values of k. Based on these facts,
it convenient to treat the AONT packet as a whole, acting
on the codeword length n, variable in its turn “on the fly”,
to reach the desired rate. After encoding, instead, the slicer
serves to create s slices, each one composed by n
s
bits where
s can assume any value; for example we can fix s equal to
the number of nodes available in the storage system.
In the next section we will show, through an explicit
numerical example, that the scheme in Fig. 6 outperforms the
AONT-RS variant in Fig. 2, thus permitting to take advantage
of the availability of a large number of storage nodes, without
the constraints imposed by the RS encoding scheme.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
As a simple but significant example, let us suppose to have a
file with length ks = 10 kB that we wish to store in ns = 2540
available nodes. Using the AONT-RS solution, this implies,
for example, the application of t = 10 times a RS(254, 127)
code (a code of this type is obtained shortening by 1 the
RS(255, 128) code). As regards the AONT-LT solution, in-
stead, though in principle one could use fragmentation as well,
we can implement the scheme in Fig. 6, according to which
the 10 kB file is encoded as a whole. The LT code adopted
uses an RSD with c = 0.1 and δ = 0.9.
The performance of the two schemes, in terms of successful
decoding probability, is shown in Fig. 7. In order to have a
sufficient statistical confidence for the results, for each value
of pe we have considered 150 simulations.
As mentioned above and expected, because of the appli-
cation of fragmentation, the curve of the AONT-RS scheme
has not a step behavior and a successful decoding probability
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Fig. 7. Comparison between the successful decoding probabilities of the
AONT-LT and the AONT-RS when, for the latter, the AONT is applied to the
whole set of ks slices.
different from 1 (perfect reconstruction) and 0 (null reconstruc-
tion) appears. Such an event that, for this particular example,
occurs for values of the slice erasure rate roughly comprised
between pe = 0.4 and pe = 0.49, defines a grey region that is
unfavorable in practice and whose extension should be made
as small as possible. In that region, in fact, the authorized
client has no guarantee that the stored information is correctly
retrieved while, at the same time, the attacker can recover
some part of the information. The grey region is present for
the AONT-LT scheme, too, where it is due to the non-MDS
character of the LT code. However, its extension is much
smaller being approximately comprised, for the present case,
between pe = 0.52 and pe = 0.54.
Incidentally, we also observe that the solution using the LT
code has better correction capability; once again, this is a con-
sequence of the fragmentation mechanism where the failure
of even 1 decoding out of t inhibits the correct reconstruction
because of the action of the AONT. For this specific example,
this means that, when using the AONT-RS solution, the client
must have access to at least 60% of the nodes to be practically
sure to reconstruct the file (versus 50% for the case without
fragmentation). On the opposite, when using the AONT-LT
solution, the authorized client is practically sure to reconstruct
the file even having access to less than 50% of the nodes. This
improved correction capability is a positive feature from the
client’s standpoint, but it is also positive from the attacker’s
standpoint. However, taking into account that the benchmark
is constituted by the step behavior centered at pe = 0.5, we
can say that the adoption of the LT code introduces a slight
deviation with respect to the ideal case, while permitting to
have the advantages related to the large number of storage
nodes used.
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AONT-LT and the AONT-RS when, for the latter, the AONT is applied to
each set of k slices.
Figure 7 refers to the case in which the AONT is applied
to the whole set of ks slices. As mentioned at the end of
Section II, by applying the AONT individually to every block
of k slices entering each RS code, the successful decoding
probability of the AONT-RS scheme improves as well. This
is shown, for the considered example, in Fig. 8. However, the
extension of the grey region increases as well, now ranging
between pe = 0.43 and pe = 0.59, and globally the curve
of successful decoding probability for the AONT-RS scheme
becomes worse than that for the AONT-LT schemes from
both the client’s and the attacker’s standpoint. The attacker,
in particular, would be able to retrieve a significant amount
of information even at a slice erasure rate in the order of
0.54, where the AONT-LT scheme ensures instead maximum
security.
V. CONCLUSION
In distributed storage systems, and particularly in CSS, there
can be a number of advantages in using a large number of
storage nodes. On the other hand, when employing the AONT-
RS system, the number of nodes is limited by the size of the
Galois field over which the code is designed and this size
cannot be large in order to limit the co/decoding complexity.
The problem can be overcome by using fragmentation, but we
have shown that this yields strong deviations of the successful
decoding probability from the ideal step behavior which is
typical of MDS codes.
So, we have proposed a variant of the joint AONT function
plus error correcting code scheme, where instead of using an
RS code we have used an LT code. We have verified that this
new proposal is able to outperform the AONT-RS scheme with
fragmentation, while maintaining a limited extension for the
grey region where the system does not work as desired.
The conclusion obtained has been shown looking at a
specific example, though randomly chosen. Further work is
in progress in view of generalization, also including more
significant and practical cases, e.g., as regards the file size
and the number of nodes.
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